As the Western Balkans continue to navigate through the choppy waters of regional stability and European Union aspirations, the specter of a “Greater Serbia” has resurfaced, thanks to recent remarks by Milorad Dodik. Over a weekend, Dodik expressed his desire for the creation of a “Greater Serbia,” a concept that would amalgamate Serbia, Montenegro, and the Serbian entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, “Republika Srpska.”
This controversial idea arrives at a time when the President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, openly communicated to the European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen that Serbia does not intend to de facto recognize the independence of Kosovo. In response, von der Leyen stated, “We want Serbia in the EU,” highlighting the EU’s continued engagement with Serbia despite its stand on Kosovo.
Almost a quarter-century ago, renowned German-Swiss journalist Viktor Meier lamented what he perceived as the EU’s “Serbo-centrism” in its policy. Fast forward to 2023, and it appears that the EU may be treading the same path. The EU’s policy of constant appeasement has not softened the aggressor, as Meier would argue, but emboldened it, with Serbia often cast in the role of the aggressor.
EU bureaucrats have been stating for a decade that “Vučić gets the job done,” implying that he will eventually agree to Kosovo’s independence. However, the reality of 2023 starkly shows a different picture: Vučić has been leading EU diplomats by the nose, having received billions from the EU budget while seemingly spurning Western values.
Serbia’s approach to international relations is as unyielding as it is strategic. As calls for sanctions against Russia echoed in European halls, Vučić was in Beijing, extending a friendly hand to Vladimir Putin. Kosovo, on its part, accepted the French-German agreement in March, including the much-debated association clause. Yet, Vučić walked away from the negotiation table, unwilling to sign, demonstrating his reluctance to concede to international pressure.
His tactics are transparent, yet seemingly invisible to those who choose to turn a blind eye. These are the ones who have been his allies in the ideas of redrawing borders, in the partition of Kosovo, and in the pursuit of a “Greater Serbia.” They are the local propagandists, the cynics’ custodians, the “geostrategists” of coffeehouses and digital chambers. Over the last 25 years, Serbia has shown a willingness to accept only one plan: the division of Kosovo. Other plans have been categorically rejected.
Vučić is expected to delay any acceptance of the French-German plan, perhaps hoping to outlast the current political climate until November 2024, with the hope that Donald Trump might enter the White House again and reset the game.
Amidst two major conflicts — Ukraine and Israel — the Western powers have limited bandwidth to deal with the “Balkan entanglements,” which, though often disregarded, have a history of becoming bloodily significant, as was evidenced on September 24th. Already, there are insinuations that the focus should not be on the signing of agreements but on their implementation.
Kosovo now faces significant challenges, and it is imperative to question whether its politicians, in both government and opposition, are fully aware of the gravity of their situation. The path to peace and stability in the Western Balkans is fraught with old ghosts and new gambits, where diplomatic finesse and the true will for European integration are put to the test.
This resurgence of the “Greater Serbia” rhetoric not only poses a challenge to regional stability but also calls into question the efficacy of the EU’s diplomatic strategies in the Balkans. Will the EU continue to cater to long-standing nationalistic aspirations at the cost of broader regional stability, or will it recalibrate its approach to uphold its values and principles? The unfolding events will be a crucial test for European diplomacy and the quest for a peaceful and integrated Balkan peninsula.
Source: Koha Ditore
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